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VILLAGE OF EUCLID V. AMBLER
REALTY Co., SEVENTY-FVE YEARS




At first blush, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' appears
anomalous, out of character for a Court deeply immersed in substan-
tive due process and preoccupied with protecting property and con-
tractual rights from regulation-prone federal and state governments.
Just three years before, the Court had invalidated a law setting mini-
mum wages for women, holding it an unwarranted intrusion with the
parties' right to contract.2 And in 1928, two years after Ambler Re-
alty, in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the author of Ambler
Realty, the Court invalidated a law limiting entry into the pharmacy
business because it denied non-pharmacists' rights to pursue a lawful
business.3 The right to own a business, said the Court, is a property
right and as such cannot be denied without some substantial justifica-
tion.4
A bit of reflection, however, reveals that Ambler Realty was a
product of its time, quite in step with substantive due process rulings
both before and after. Cases in that era had a common denominator-
the perimeters of the Due Process Clause were defined by the com-
mon law.5 The Euclid zoning ordinance was saved because it was
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I appreciate the efforts of Peter
Gerhardt and Wendy Wagner in deciphering and criticizing an earlier draft of this Article. I am
also indebted to Adam Rosen for his diligent research efforts.
' 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
3 See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), overruled by North Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).4 See id. atlIll.
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) (arguing that
Lochner-era cases used the common law as a baseline for due process analysis).
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premised upon, and in its application operated very close to, the base-
line of common-law nuisance. The Court tells us that the Village's
twelve square miles were divided into six distinct use districts, rang-
ing from single-family residential (the highest use) to sewage and
garbage disposal facilities, penal and correctional facilities, homes for
the mentally feeble, and so on-uses no "right thinking" person
would want to reside within a stone's throw of. What justified these
six different use zones, which, at least according to the realty com-
pany's unchallenged assertion, reduced the value of its parcel from
$10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre?7 Common-law nuisance. As the
Court said,
the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly
helpful clew. And the law of nuisances . . . may be con-
sulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful
aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope
of, the power.... A nuisance may be merely a right thing in
the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barn-
yard.
8
True, the Court did not hold that Euclid's zoning districts were so
discretely drawn that one use was sufficiently incompatible with its
adjacent use so as to constitute an unreasonable interference with its
neighbor. Such a claim was unnecessary because the plaintiff sought
an injunction alleging the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face.
And Euclid's ordinance was close enough to nuisance prevention to
leave for another day the constitutionality of its application.9
Since Ambler Realty, there has been a sea of change in the zon-
ing paradigm, so much so that a good portion of moder-day zoning
6 See Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. at 380.
7 See id. at 384.
8 Id. at 387-88 (citations omitted). The Court then launched into a lengthy discussion
that clearly reflects a bias in favor of the single-family homeowner. Not only did the Court
recognize the obvious-that heavy industrial uses (the only kind back in 1926) were incompati-
ble with residential use-but it also recognized that homeowners had to be protected from
apartment dwellings and those who occupied them. The Court explained: "[Tihe development
of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has
sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such
sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite . I. " Id. at 397. The Court goes on
to talk about how children in detached houses will lose their play areas and eventually there will
be nothing left of single-family residences in the community. See id. at 394-95. One might
speculate that the leeway the Court extended to local zoning regulations was prompted more by
its belief that the values of those residing in single-family homes must be protected from foreign
influences than by any respect the Court owed to the regulatory decisions of local governments.
Euclid, in other words, used zoning correctly by pursuing ends the Court approved of-more
evidence that Ambler Realty fits comfortably within the due process decisions of its era.
9 That occurred two years later in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
(declaring a Cambridge zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied). Nectow was the last case
in which the Court declared a local zoning ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of due
process. See infra note 15.
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would be unrecognizable to Mr. Justice Sutherland and the United
States Supreme Court of 1925. Many modem zoning ordinances,
particularly those enacted by communities with significant develop-
ment potential, care little about whether apartment buildings might
somehow steal the light and air from single family residences or
whether factories will make life miserable for those living down-
wind. Developing communities worry about preserving wetlands,
historically significant buildings, open space, agricultural land, views
of the Pacific Ocean (environmental amenities), 0 and/or ensuring a
viable local tax base.
Obviously today's environmental zoning ordinances (if I may
use that term) reflect the desire of those who dominate the political
process, resident homeowners," just as the nuisance-based zoning
ordinances seventy-five years ago reflected the desires of the same
group of political constituents. The difference lies in the nature of the
harms feared by the homeowners. But that is not the only reason for
these new environmental zoning regulations. Many of us view land
differently today than we did seventy-five years ago. No longer is
land viewed through a frontier lens that assumed abundance. Land,
particularly urban, suburban, and ex-urban land, is viewed by many as
a scarce resource. Not only is land scarce, but it is also a commodity
that can be consumed. And once consumed, it is forever lost; what-
ever enjoyment the public received from the land, whether it was the
foliage, the scenery it afforded, or the wildlife it harbored, can never
be retrieved. In other words, land, even land held in private hands,
has taken on a public character. For instance, the Nollans may have
had title to their southern California beach but it was not the Nollans'
beach alone. The public, according to the California Coastal Com-
mission, had a right to enjoy it as well. 12 And the Justs' pristine lake-
front property in northern Wisconsin was not reserved only for them
to enjoy; Marinette County believed that all the residents abutting
Lake Noquebay had a stake in the Justs' homebuilding plans.13 The
examples go on.
As the focus of zoning has shifted from the effects of one use
upon another's reasonable enjoyment to preserving the environmental
character or amenities of a particular community or neighborhood, so
too has the focus of constitutional litigation shifted from the substan-
tive Due Process Clause of the Ambler Realty era (a clause protecting
the individual's right to be distinct from the state) to the Takings
10 For a catalogue of modem uses of zoning, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Feder-
alism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L REv. 464,464-67 (2000).
" See William A. Fischel, Municipal Corporations, Homeowners, and the Benefit View of
the Property Tax, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Wallace Oates ed.,
forthcoming 2001).
12 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13 See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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Clause 4 (a clause which presupposes that individuals owe a duty to
the state) in the modem era. Much of the reason for this shift is the
Court's reluctance to invoke substantive due process. 15  However,
there are financial reasons as well. Landowners whose development
goals are frustrated by local land use restrictions cannot be made
whole by an injunctive remedy. After all of the negotiation, the re-
submission of development plans, the judicial backlogs, and the like,
the lag time between a developer's purchase of the land and the hoped
for injunction is too long.' 6 Modem-day developers want to be paid
for their inability to build during this period. The Takings Clause
permits this.'
7
The question is whether the shift from substantive due process to
the Takings Clause requires more than just a shift in the constitution-
ally prescribed remedy-damages or injunctive relief to just compen-
sation-but requires us to rethink, as well, the respective roles of lo-
cal governments and courts in local land use policy. There are those
who claim that the answer is yes, that in some circumstances regula-
tions which "down-zone" property, thus making it less valuable,
should be presumptively invalid. My opinion is otherwise.
I.
There is no need to recount the history of regulatory takings.
That would be well beyond the limited space allotted and has been
well done elsewhere. 18 Moreover, it has little to do with my point.
One piece of history, however, does have something to do with my
14 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."). Only one zoning ordinance was struck down by the Supreme Court be-
tween its 1926 decision in Ambler Realty and 1987, when the Supreme Court first used the
Takings Clause to restrict local land use regulation and then only because its application was
deemed to violate due process. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185. Takings litigation has been mark-
edly more successful. In the last 14 years, the Court has struck down four land use regulations
under the Takings Clause and has granted certiorari in another case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
746 A.2d 707 (R.L 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000).
1' But see Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 527 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 698
(1999) (detailing the time from application to denial by the city as five years, five formal deci-
sions, and 19 different site plans).
17 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987). The Due Process Clause would also support a damage action, but only if the ordinance
itself is arbitrary and beyond reason, serving no legitimate public purpose. Moreover, assuming
that such a finding was made, the city could pay damages, amend the ordinance, and force the
developer to start the approval and litigation process all over again. According to First English,
the compensation remedy not only gives damages for the period during which the community
overregulated but would force the community to either approve the development plans or take
the title to the property and pay the developer the property's fair market value. See id. at 320-
21.
18 See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996) (examining the history of
regulatory takings); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984) (analyzing various approaches to regulatory takings).
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point (which I promise to reveal shortly). The Court in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council19 held that a land use regulation that
reduces the value of one's property to zero is presumptively a taking.
The only way in which the presumption can be rebutted is to demon-
strate that the restriction imposed by the regulation "inhere[s] in the
title itself."20 Translated, this means that only if the regulation mir-
rors the restriction imposed by common-law principles of nuisance
will the regulating agency be excused from paying just compensation
to the landowner. Legislative declarations of harm unrelated to that
recognized by common-law nuisance that, in other circumstances
(due process, e.g.), might be sufficient to justify the regulation are of
no value or importance to the Court.
Why are legislative declarations of harm so heavily discounted?
The Lucas Court is unclear.2 ' Possibly the Court believed that the
right to compensation in the event of a taking is a fundamental right.
Deference to legislative declarations is therefore unwarranted. But
that reading would probably require overruling a decision decided
two years after Ambler Realty, which upheld Virginia's right, without
paying compensation, to decide that the state's apple crop was more
valuable than its ornamental cedar tree crop, thus justifying destroy-
ing the latter to preserve the former.22 There is no hint that the Lucas
Court questioned the continuing vitality of Miller. Moreover, reading
Lucas as a formalistic fundamental rights case would not explain why
the Court, just six years before Lucas, deferred to a city council's
adoption of boiler-plate, generic, and rather vague findings of harm,
made without supporting evidence or even hearings in a case chal-
lenging a zoning ordinance that restricted the land available for
"adult" entertainment on First Amendment grounds.
2 3
More likely, the Court, at least sub rosa, has in some part ac-
cepted a theory of political economics called public choice,24 a theory
that ultimately places more trust in courts than in local policymakers.
Adapted to local land use regulations, public choice theory posits that
zoning ordinances promulgated either by small homogeneous com-
munities or politically unaccountable state agencies (the South Caro-
" 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2 I& at 1029.
21 Justice Kennedy broke with the majority over the issue of how the Court should treat
legislative declarations of harm. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But that left five
Justices to whom legislative declarations of harm in regulatory takings cases are essentially
worthless.
2 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
23 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a city
zoning ordinance prohibiting adult motion-picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, residential dwelling, church, park, or school).
24 The seminal work on public choice remains JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1962).
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lina Coastal Council, for example) that vary from the norm of zoning
in that community should be presumptively invalid. I am not going
to go into all the reasons supporting this conclusion, nor will I analyze
the contrary literature; I have done that elsewhere.26 I will simply say
that public choice adherents mistrust small homogeneous communi-
ties because they are controlled by what James Madison called fac-
tions,27 cohesive majorities which drown out minority voices. Land
use regulations are particularly suspect because land is immobile-it
cannot be moved to a more regulatory friendly jurisdiction.28 Moreo-
ver, many small local governmental units have little legislative
authority over matters other than land use.29 Minority landowners
thus have very little to trade for majoritarian support of their proposed
land uses.
Public choice theory is, or at least was, a model, if you will, of
political decision-making. With its apparent application in Lucas to
land use regulations, however, the theory has taken on normative di-
mensions. I have no objection to fashioning new constitutional rules
to account for changed circumstances; I ordinarily applaud efforts to
do so. But even I have my limits. The new constitutional rule must
either reflect a changed moral sense that requires an old constitutional
rule be changed, lest respect for that rule, or (pardon a bit of hyper-
bole) maybe the rule of law itself, is put in jeopardy or the existing
constitutional rule must have lost its empirical base. 30  Brown v.
25See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385 (1977); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992) (arguing for a shift in the presump-
tion of constitutionality of local land use regulations enacted by small, homogeneous communi-
ties).
26 See Durchslag, supra note 10, at 464-67.
27 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
28 Indeed, for purposes of the Takings Clause, Justice Scalia in Lucas distinguished be-
tween land use regulations and value-diminishing regulations affecting other forms of property.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).
29 With one exception, Ohio townships do not possess general police powers. Rather,
township powers are specific and are enumerated in various provisions of Title 5 of the Ohio
Revised Code. The exception permits the voters of a township to adopt limited self-
government-with the emphasis, however, on "limited." Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
504.04 (West 1994), with OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 ("Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."),
and State ex. rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 53 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio 1944) (holding that all municipal corpo-
rations possess home rule powers whether or not they have chosen to adopt a charter pursuant to
Article XVIII, § 3).
30 The textual assertion may sound familiar. The joint opinion for the Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), uses a somewhat similar rationale in asserting that
stare decisis requires that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), not be overruled. According to
Justice O'Connor, the Court should not overrule cases like Roe "that have responded to national
controversies" unless it can demonstrate that the outcome "rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions." Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 861-62. Similarity of phrasing should not,
however, mask my disagreement with the Casey joint opinion. Cases should be reconsidered
[Vol. 51:645
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Board of Education3l is an example of the first. Separate but equal
simply became unacceptable as a matter of moral consensus, leaving
the Court with little choice but to get rid of Jim Crow. Roe v. Wade
may well be an example of the latter, although there are others, such
as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and other New Deal
cases. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe explicitly relies on then-
recent medical evidence to support the Court's trimester approach to a
woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. Additionally,
the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey34 is in part justified
by the fact that a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy
is closely tied to her ability to fully participate in the economic, so-
cial, and intellectual life of the country.35
I am confident that there is no moral outrage about the zoning
regulations of small homogeneous communities even approaching
that of the indignities of segregated public facilities, even in 1954.
Moreover, what little empirical evidence exists with regard to
whether the public choice model explains restrictive zoning ordi-
nances is at best inconclusive. And (here comes my point) without a
rather clear empirical basis for doing so, it would be improper to
fashion a new constitutional rule of deference.
II.
I have decided to focus this paper more on the public
choice/process side of the constitutional change equation than on the
normative/moral outrage side. Consequently, my comments with re-
spect to the latter will be limited. Richard Epstein has written (and
this is and must be for sake of space a gross oversimplification) that
any regulation, land use or otherwise, that extracts from the regulated
party more value than it returns to the general public in the form of
benefits is a taking.36 Professor Epstein opines that anything less is a
simple wealth transfer from one person or group to another, what
and constitutional principles revised if they are wrong, whether the error stems from factual
assumptions that were at the time or later proven false, or from flawed internal reasoning of the
decision, or, as suggested in the text, from an evolution in the moral consensus, if any, that
supported the old principle.
3' 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional).
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a Texas law banning abortion violated the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
33 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act was neither an invalid
exercise of Congress's commerce power nor a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
3 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that stare decisis required that the essential holding of
Roe v. Wade be affirmed).
35 See id. at 860-61.
36 See RIcHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
20011
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Cass Sunstein calls a naked preference. 37 And naked preferences are
arbitrary and thus unfair. Therein lies the basis for a normative rule
that when a majority of landowners wish to use government to pre-
serve the environment they have become used to enjoying by pre-
venting others, primarily outsiders, from enjoying those same benefits
in that community, they should be prevented from doing so unless (a)
the regulations are efficient (i.e., that the benefits to the residents
outweigh the costs to the regulated landowners and potential housing
consumers); and (b) the regulations are equitable (i.e., "the landowner
should be able to recognize that ... his own long term self-interest in
avoiding the administrative costs of minor compensatory payments
makes it fair to deny him compensation" 38).
If Brown is the paradigm of consensus on the moral justification
(or lack thereof) for a particular set of regulations, then the attempt to
preserve the rural character of a suburban or ex-urban community, to
ensure that no individual can have exclusive rights to view the beauty
of an ocean, or to limit the density of development so that wildlife
habitats are not unduly disrupted, hardly rises to the same level of
moral outrage as imposing significant burdens on individuals because
of the belief that certain physical characteristics make those individu-
als unfit to associate with the rest of humankind. That is why the
courts pay no attention to legislative declarations of justification for
regulations that limit benefits on the basis of race, religion, gender, or
sexual preference 39 but care little for second-guessing legislatures
when the same claim of discrimination is based on whether one is an
optician or an optometrist,40 a lawyer or a debt adjuster,4' or a bakery
employee or a bakery proprietor.4 2
The only time zoning regulations even arguably approach the
moral outrage of Jim Crow is when they deprive a landowner of all
economic value of her investment: the facts of Lucas, in other words.
The reason is that all regulation either does or certainly has the po-
tential to reduce one person's wealth and enhance that of another.
37 See Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689 (1984) (defining and describing a naked preference). Professor Epstein criticized the
Lucas Court for permitting zoning regulations that stop short of extracting all economic value
from the regulated property. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).
38 Ellickson, supra note 25, at 419.
39 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring a Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting the state or any local political subdivision from adopting any law spe-
cifically protecting homosexuals from discrimination to be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause).
4o See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a law that permit-
ted only an optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit eyeglass lenses).
41 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (permitting a law which allowed only
lawyers to be debt adjusters).
42 But see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a law which limited
bakery employees' work hours).
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That is why we regulate; it is certainly why we tax. Moreover, when
we regulate in a way that removes all economic value from a person's
property, as South Carolina did in Lucas, there is no consensus that
even reaches the moral indignation level of Jim Crow when other
public values are at stake, as the Lucas dissents attest.43
But that is not the point, for the same lack of moral consensus
could be said of how we view homosexuals. Yet the Court decided
Romer v. Evans.44 The question is not whether we, as a polity, be-
lieve that an economic wipeout for environmental benefits is an argu-
able trade-Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas made a pretty good case
that it is not. Moreover, most would agree that wholly unanticipated
government regulations wiping out individual investment, which
come out of left field, as it were, might be morally indefensible with-
out the compensation remedy. 45 But the Court's takings jurispru-
dence is strangely lacking in exressions of moral outrage. In Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court unanimously upheld the
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, which permitted the state to con-
demn large residential tracks of land in order to transfer ownership to
current lessees. If ever there was a case for the exercise of moral out-
rage, Midkiff was it, for even though compensation was paid, the pur-
pose was simply to redistribute oligarchic wealth to peasant tenant
farmers. It was, in other words, the epitome of special interest, de-
mocracy-run-wild legislation. Justice O'Connor's opinion recognized
that compensation does not justify a simple governmentally dictated
wealth transfer. But having paid lip service to that moral principle,
the Court simply deferred to Hawaii's determination that breaking the
land oligopoly served larger public purposes. Indeed, the Court's
deference to the legislative determination that the condemnation was
for a "public use" all but made the "public use" requirement of the
Fifth Amendment non-justiciable.
The deference shown to the findings of harm by the politically
accountable Hawaii legislature when compared to the lack of respect
accorded the declarations of harm by the politically unaccountable
43 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047-52 (1992) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); id. at 1071-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There is certainly nothing wrong,
for example, with levying a tax that forces businesses to close, with whatever attendant loss of
investment that entails. See Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974) (upholding a
20% gross-receipts tax on those who operate parking lots).
44 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
45 See Frank L Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967); cf. Saul
Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 1657 (1999). Professor
Levmore argues that there should be no takings compensation at all unless the takings claimant
could not have reasonably expected to be regulated at all, whether the regulation was in place at
the time she made the investment or not. This rule, Levmore argues, would encourage individu-
als to anticipate government regulations and take the necessary corrective action in advance.
See id. at 1657-60.
46 465 U.S. 1097 (1984).
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coastal commissions of California and South Carolina leads me to
conclude that the Court's takings jurisprudence is grounded not in
moral concerns but in the process-based suspicion about politically
unaccountable bodies and the public choice assumptions regarding
certain popularly elected legislative bodies which are particularly
prone to factional rule. In those bodies, legislative declarations of
harm, particularly in a land use context, are little more than self-
serving, post hoc attempts to rationalize wealth transfers and are thus
entitled to no judicial respect. Only the majesty of the common law
of property and nuisance can justify a regulation that extracts too
much value from a parcel of property. It is to the concerns of gov-
ernment by faction that I now turn.
III.
A.
I have already stated how public choice theory intersects with the
Takings Clause, but it bears repeating. Public choice advocates posit
that people act out of their own self-interest. They compromise only
when necessary to achieve what they want and only when that given
up is equal to or less than that received in return.47 Elected represen-
tatives, on the other hand, maximize their desires by getting re-
elected. And they do that by responding to the wishes of their con-
stituents. Thus, if residents of a small suburban or ex-urban commu-
nity feel their lifestyle being threatened by a large new housing de-
velopment or a new shopping mall, they will demand that their
elected representatives do everything possible within the boundaries
of their legislative capacities to stop or limit the development propos-
als. The representatives will likely do so because they want to remain
in the same seat after the next election. Moreover, the smaller the
community and the more it is dominated by a single faction, such as
homeowners in suburban and ex-urban communities,48 the less yield-
ing the elected governors will be to developing counter pressures.
And since land use issues dominate the political agenda of these
communities, developers and dissenting landowners will find it very
difficult to change anyone's mind because they have nothing to offer
in exchange, except maybe an increased tax base. But the residents
have already decided that an increased tax base, even if that produces
enhanced services, is not worth the cost to their lifestyle. The prob-
47 This is certainly in part what Justice Holmes meant in Mahon when he said that regula-
tion is justified if it gives the regulated individual "an average reciprocity of advantage." Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Homeowners therefore might sacrifice
the monetary advantage of selling their property to one who wants to build a shopping center on
it because they understand that their neighbor is similarly restricted.
48 See Fischel, supra note 11.
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lem is exacerbated by the fact that dissenting property owners, be-
cause of a lack of exit opportunities 49 are pretty much stuck with the
local community's views. To top it off, there is a process-based con-
cern exacerbated by, but independent of, the public choice assump-
tions. More often than not, neither the person stuck (the developer)
nor consumers of the ultimate product, be they potential homeowners
or shoppers looking for Wal-Mart's bargain prices, reside in the
community. Thus they have limited, if any, opportunity to have their
views considered by local political decision-makers.
If things worked this way on a broad enough scale, those who
would turn a model for explaining political behavior into a constitu-
tional rule would have a strong argument. But the evidence that the a
priori public choice assumptions described above explain land use
regulatory behavior of local communities and/or their zoning boards
is neither terribly strong nor overly persuasive. That is not to say that
some local governing boards do not fit the model. I am sure there is
plenty of anecdotal evidence to support that such governing boards
exist. They may even represent a majority or at least a significant
plurality. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that would
indicate zoning authorities with a far more objective and republican
approach to local land use disputes. In other words, even if individu-
als who reside in the community act only out of narrow self-interest,
their representatives do not follow in lock step. Moreover, several
recent studies of rural zoning authorities suggest that the public
choice model of land use decisions in small, homogeneous communi-
ties, even if demonstrable at some level, is not sufficiently universal
to justify a new constitutional rule or even the Supreme Court's cur-
rent level of distrust. I will briefly describe my own anecdotal evi-
dence, limited though it may be. I will then note the conclusions of
more scientifically conducted studies. While some support the public
choice model, others do not. And taken as a whole, these studies tend
to raise more questions than provide answers.
B.
In preparation for a talk in early November 2000, I collected ap-
proximately five months of newspaper articles about local zoning is-
sues from the Chagrin Valley Times, a community newspaper that
reports on the goings-on in southeastern Cuyahoga and southwestern
and south-central Geauga counties.50  Most of the reported zoning
49 It may cost me something, but I can move my money from stock investment A to stock
investment B. My land, however, cannot be moved from township A to township B. Moreover,
I am more likely to have my life savings tied up in my home than in Intel.
50 I chose that newspaper because it serves the community in which I live. For those
unfamiliar with the local geography, the area described includes Cleveland's easternmost sub-
urbs and ex-urbs (those too rural to meet or too proud to admit the suburban characterization).
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disputes were rather routine: parking requirements for the only
downtown (more appropriately in-town) shopping area, bond issues
for sewer lines, disputes over commercial encroachments on residen-
tial areas, and the like. With few exceptions, these were neighbor-to-
neighbor disputes, something very common to both urban and subur-
ban zoning boards and from which one can draw no conclusion re-
garding whether zoning boards or village councils and township trus-
tees resemble the public choice model. One exception concerned a
dispute between a shopping center developer and Bainbridge Town-
ship's trustees regarding maximum lot coverage for a proposed new
shopping center.5 While the township ordinance limiting the shop-
ping center to forty percent of the development parcel might be
viewed by some as anti-development, it is hardly so severe as to con-
stitute a taking. In addition, the amount of commercial development
in the township scarcely reflects an anti-commercial development
bias. If anything, it demonstrates that shopping centers in the town-
ship can operate very profitably on forty percent of their acreage. In
any event, the township and the developer eventually agreed upon an
acceptable lot coverage restriction, allowing the shopping center to
proceed and suggesting that the township trustees are perfectly will-
ing to compromise whatever anti-development bias they or their con-
stituents have.52  Put differently, tax-base considerations prevailed
over concerns of over-urbanization and all its attendant problems.
Another land use dispute at approximately the same time is more
interesting and more pertinent to the public choice model. The trus-
tees of the township in which I live 53 decided to encourage increased
development in the township by setting aside land for commercial
development and encouraging cluster home development. Their at-
tempts were thwarted by none other than the Geauga County Planning
Commission, which took the position that the good residents of the
township could not possibly have wanted this kind of land use in their
community. 54  The planning commission may have been right or
51 See Joan Demirjian, Bainbridge Guide Plan Buried with Development, CHAGRIN
VALLEY TIMES, July 6, 2000, at 16 (discussing Bainbridge plans for proposed shopping center);
Joan Demirjian, Bye, Bye Bainbridge, CHAGRIN VALLEY TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at I (discussing
an attempted annexation of the shopping center).
52 See Joan Demirjian, It's Official! Heritage Withdraws Annexation Petition, CHAGRIN
VALLEY TIMES, Jan. 25, 2001, at 10.
5-3 Auburn Township could be the poster child for public choice theorists. The 2000 Cen-
sus reported that Auburn Township had a racially homogenous population (white) of 5,158
persons, up 56.4% (the largest growth rate in Geauga County and fifth largest in the five-county
region). See Greater Cleveland, by the Numbers, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 17, 2001, at 8A.
The township covers a fair amount of land, most of which remains either farm land or small,
older homes on large parcels. This very rural setting is punctuated by several (but increasing)
housing developments scattered throughout the township in a more or less random way, most of
which are, for want of a better term, "up-scale."
5 See Nancy Remley, Auburn Defends Plan for High-Density Zone, CHAGRIN VALLEY
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at 6 (discussing proposed township zoning amendment).
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wrong in their assessment of local public opinion, but the commission
did turn the public choice model on its head. The county, which ap-
points the planning commission and to which the commission is re-
sponsible, is far more heterogeneous than is the township. Yet it is
the county that seems to be anti-development, or pro-NIMBY, if you
prefer. And it is the township trustees who, according to the public
choice model, should be jerking their collective knee to prevent de-
velopment (at least if the commission is correct about the residents'
preferences). Yet, if one believes the county planning commission,
the trustees are the ones who are seemingly ignoring the wishes of
their constituents to promote what they perceive is the best long-term
interest of the township as a whole.55 No doubt one could dismiss all
of this as terribly unscientific, underinclusive, and selective in the
worst sense. But as the following sub-section would seem to demon-
strate, my highly selective and limited examples may not be unrepre-
sentative.
C.
Two words describe the data on why local zoning authorities de-
cide to do what they do: paucity and inconclusive. 56 Apparent, how-
ever, is that the factors that determine whether the model resembles
reality are far more varied than either the model or the argued-for
constitutional rule would allow. Certainly local legislators are influ-
enced by constituent desires. In a study of nine metropolitan areas,
James Clingermayer concluded that local decision-makers are respon-
sive to their constituents in land use decisions. 57 Moreover, Clinger-
mayer's study, consistent with the public choice model, concluded
that "a high rate of home ownership encourages exclusionary policies
... that home values, income levels, and white population size are all
significantly associated with exclusionary zoning." 58  On the other
55 The county, I believe, is wrong. The dispute over development occurred less than one
month after a contentious election that saw two of the three township trustees replaced by those
who, according to the county planning commission, had little idea of the township residents'
real desires. The two new trustees were not members of the same political party as the county
commissioners.
56I am not going to recite the literature pro and con on public choice and whether it com-
ports with reality. That is well catalogued elsewhere. See Durchslag, supra note 10, at 482-83,
487.
57 See James C. Clingermayer, Quasi-Judicial Decision-Making and Exclusionary Zoning,
31 URB. AFr. REV. 544 (1996). The nine metropolitan areas studied were Chicago, Los Ange-
les, Newark, Cleveland, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Denver, Portland, Orlando, and Atlanta.
58 Id. at 549. It is difficult to deny the influence of race in local zoning decisions. In an
extensive study of 1,510 cities, towns, counties, and townships in the 25 major metropolitan
areas of the United States, Rolf Pendall noted that "[z]oning... was invented in part to keep
minorities away from non-Hispanic Whites" and that the most recent data on zoning decisions
tend to support that zoning still has that effect. Rofl Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and
the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 125, 125-26 (2000). That may well have
prompted the Ambler Realty Court's concern for the homeowner as well. See supra note 8.
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hand, Clingermayer also found that these same decision-makers are
influenced by judicial rulings and the views of state zoning/planning
agencies.
Clingermayer's finding of receptivity to the views of resident
homeowners is largely confirmed by an extensive study of three
Vermont and five New York rural towns. Leslie King and Glenn
Harris found that the planning boards in these eight towns were far
more "flexible and accommodating in their treatment of long-term
residents of the community, particularly those with small, family
projects" than they were to large, outside developers.59 In other
words, these boards responded positively, by and large, to community
pressure to preserve the rural character of their towns. It would be
erroneous, however, to conclude that all towns were anti-growth.
King and Harris found that two towns, one in New York and one in
Vermont, were decidedly pro-growth and thus pro-developer. And
two New York towns sought to manage growth rather than prevent or
slow it.
60
It is also difficult to deny the public choice assertion that the size
of the governing unit has something to do with the degree to which
constituent desires are reflected in local land use decisions. In a one-
year study of 2,290 rezoning applications in the City of Atlanta,
Arnold Fleischmann concluded that "the image of rezoning as a
highly charged political process controlled by public protest is mis-
leading.' '61  In a large city like Atlanta, citizen participation was
minimal and the decisions of the local zoning board regarding rezon-
ing were strongly influenced, if not determined, by the recommenda-
tions of the professional planning staff. Fleischmann's findings ap-
pear to be supported, certainly inferentially, by Todd Donovan and
Max Neiman, who studied the relationship between local political
processes and local growth policies.62 Not surprisingly, the study
found that direct democracy, such as initiative and referenda, was
more likely than legislative enactments to be growth-restrictive. On
the other hand, the converse is also true. Land use regulations drafted
by legislative bodies are usually less restrictive and more encouraging
of growth than the citizens' unfiltered desires. If nothing else, this
study certainly raises questions about the strict agency assumptions of
the public choice model.
59 Leslie King & Glenn Harris, Local Responses to Rapid Rural Growth: New York and
Vermont Cases, 55 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 181, 185 (1989).
60 See id. at 186-87.
61 Arnold Fleischmann, Politics, Administration, and Local Land-Use Regulation: Ana-
lyzing Zoning as a Policy Process, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 337, 342 (1989).
62 See Todd Donovan & Max Neiman, Citizen Mobilization and the Adoption of Local
Growth Control, 45 W. POL. Q. 651 (1992) (discussing the increase land use controls and the
effects of citizen mobilization).
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Beyond these findings, a consistent pattern is difficult to discern.
Two studies would suggest that neither homogeneity itself nor homo-
geneity coupled with a predominance of home ownership are reliable
predictors of restrictive land use regulations. In a study of seventy-
nine communities with populations ranging from 1,000 to 100,000
people, Stephen Pratt and David Rogers attempted to determine how
population, economic growth, and organizational size explain the
adoption of land use controls.63 They found (contrary to the
Fleischmann study) that neither the size of a planning organization
nor the existence of professional planners was important to adopting
land use controls. Interestingly, the affluence of the community was
also not important. Instead, the three most influential factors were (1)
the number of annexations in the area (the more annexations, the
more likely are land use controls);64 (2) the education level of the
population (the more educated, the more likely are innovative and
development-friendly land use regulations like planned unit zoning);
and (3) the types of jobs the residents have (the more white collar
jobs, the smaller the likelihood of restrictive land use regulations).65
Finally, two studies of zoning decisions in rural Wisconsin ap-
pear to directly contradict the public choice model of local land use
decisions. One was a study of four rural counties, one of which was
populated largely by residents of incorporated yet small towns and
villages under heavy development pressure, while the others were
more rural and under little current development pressures.66 The most
important concern of all four county boards was the health and safety
of the residents-traditional police power concerns, in other words.
Special interest politics, personal ties between the applicants and the
members of the zoning committee, and the fear of a negative reaction
from constituents played little role in the decisions. The same author,
in a study two years earlier, reached much the same conclusion.
67
Focusing on 100 rezoning decisions in the same four counties be-
tween March and August 1991, Last found that committee members
heeded residents' concerns about proposed development projects only
if "these objections were based on bona fide threats to health or prop-
erty.... [The decisions were] based on case facts, hearing testimony,
and especially [the committee members'] experience with prior deci-
63 See Stephen R. Pratt & David L Rogers, Correlates of the Adoption of Land Use Con-
trols, 51 RURALSOc. 354 (1986).
6 More likely than not, this is the result of pre-annexation agreements in which a devel-
oper agrees to land use regulations in exchange for city services such as water, sewer, etc.
65 See Pratt & Rogers, supra note 63, at 361.
66 See Donald G. Last, Understanding the Motives of Rural Zoning Decision Makers, 10
Soc'Y & NAT. RESoURCES 567 (1997).
67 See Donald G. Last, Incremental Land-Use Decision Making Displayed by County
Zoning Committees, 50 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 21 (1995) (explaining decision-
making processes used by zoning committees).
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sions [stare decisis, in other words]," not by self-interest, politics, or
pressure from developers.
68
Admittedly, one might argue that county zoning committees,
even rural county zoning committees, may not be good examples
from which to criticize the public choice model. They represent a
wider constituency than does a town or township and, thus, are
subject to a different set of constituency factors, not the least of
which is that the greater size may mean less personal familiarity
with citizen objectors and, more significantly, less reliance on any
single zoning issue for reelection.6 - But one does not know that a
priori. One can only posit that that may be the case. And that is
my point. Conflicting evidence, even if it leans in the direction of
proving the public choice model, is nevertheless an insufficient
basis for a federal constitutional presumption against the validity
of local anti-development land use regulations. Federal constitu-
tional presumptions operate like federal statutes-they apply a uni-
form standard nationwide. To use the words of devolution advo-
cates, those who argue for a constitutional rule based on a public
choice model must assume that "one size fits all." That is an anti-
federalism assumption, one that must be rejected based on current
evidence.
CONCLUSION
If it is not already apparent, let me be clear. I am deeply suspi-
cious of overarching explanatory theories that purport to decide or
even explain decisions across a broad spectrum. Human behavior and
motivations are far too complex for such simplicity. But these theo-
ries are useful as a way of beginning to think about complex prob-
lems, and, as long as they remain draped in policy judgment clothing,
they are relatively harmless. Policy judgments are rarely if ever set in
stone. Constitutional judgments are of a different order. They are set
in stone, even if it is sandstone that can, over time, be rubbed away.
Consequently, those committed to constitutional federalism as a sys-
6 Id. at 23.
69 Indeed Last's 1997 study found that the county zoning committees always denied re-
zoning applications where the town board objected to them, indicating a deference to local
impact. See Last, supra note 65, at 570. On the other hand, one cannot be sure that the defer-
ence shown local town boards is not based simply on comity and a desire to avoid conflict be-
tween two political entities that have to work together consistently rather than knuckling-under
to the selfish desires of a cohesive local citizenry. (More likely than not the county board and
the town board are members of the same political party.) Nor can one be sure of the reasons for
the town board's objections. These may or may not be based on constituent pressure. And even
if the town board's concerns are based on constituent pressure, one doesn't know whether that
was based only on NIMBY or whether more legitimate fears may have prompted the response.
More studies might be illuminating.
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tem of governance should think long and hard before embracing the
public choice explanatory model as a constitutional fait accompli.

